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LITERAL AND PURPOSIVE
TECHNIQUES OF LEGISLATIVE
INTERPRETATION: SOME EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND ENGLISH COMMON
LAW PERSPECTIVES
Ian McLeod∗
I.

INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF TWO TRADITIONS

T

he United Kingdom’s entry1 into the European Economic
Community (as it then was)2 involved an intimate intermingling of two of the world’s great legal traditions: the English
legal system’s common law tradition3 and the Community legal
system’s civil law (or Roman law based) tradition. Among the
more obvious differences between the two traditions are the
English doctrines of the legislative supremacy of Parliament
and binding precedent, neither of which has any counterpart
within the civil law tradition. Although the doctrinal constraints within which the English legal system functions have
not, in practice, generally inhibited judicial creativity to any
substantial extent, the United Kingdom’s entry into the Community did at least raise the perception of one particular area of
difficulty, namely the difference between the English technique
of literalism in the process of legislative interpretation and the
civil law technique of purposive (or teleological, to use the civil
law’s own terminology) interpretation.
∗ LLB, BA, BPhil, Solicitor of the Supreme Court, England and Wales;
Head of Division of Law, London Metropolitan University (UK). This article
is based on a paper given on September 19, 2003 at Brooklyn Law School as a
contribution to a Symposium on the theme of Creating and Interpreting Law
in a Multi-Lingual Environment.
1. Entry became effective on January 1, 1973.
2. In practice, the European Economic Community (“EEC”) came to be
known simply as the European Community (“EC”), but this usage was not
formalized until the Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on European Union, or
“TEU”). The phrase Community law is to be preferred to the more commonly
encountered Union law because the Community is still an essentially legal
entity while the Union is a political entity.
3. The phrase English legal system is used here with its conventional
meaning to describe the legal system of England and Wales.

File: McLeod5.25.03.doc

1110

Created on: 5/25/2004 8:11 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 6/25/2004 2:35 PM

[Vol. 29:3

Article I. Lord Denning MR4 gave voice to this perception
when, having compared the detailed drafting of English legislation with the open-textured drafting of the Community Treaty,
he said:
Beyond doubt the English courts must follow the same principles [of interpretation] as the European court. Otherwise
there would be differences between the [member states]. That
would never do. All the courts of all [the member states]
should interpret the [Treaty] in the same way.5

The discussion contained within this Article will show that
this perception of the extent of the distinction between English
and Community techniques of interpretation was (at least in
relation to the contemporary English practice of legislative interpretation) a significant overstatement,6 before proceeding to
compare the English version of purposivism with that employed
by the European Court of Justice.7
II. LITERAL AND PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN ENGLISH LAW
There can be no doubt that, in the Nineteenth Century, the
English courts were strongly inclined towards a literal approach
to legislative interpretation. For example, in the Sussex Peerage Case,8 Lord Tindal CJ said:
If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound
4. The Master of the Rolls is the most senior judge of the Court of Appeal
(Civil Division). The Court of Appeal ranks between the High Court and the
House of Lords. In the overall order of judicial precedence, the Master of the
Rolls ranks immediately below the Lord Chief Justice, who presides over the
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), and is the most senior member of the
judiciary.
5. See HP Bulmer Ltd. v. J Bollinger SA [1974] 3 W.L.R. 202, 226 (Eng.).
The same point was made by the European Court of Justice in Amministrazione della Finanze del Stato v. Simmenthal SpA (“Rules of Community law
must be fully and uniformly applied in all the Member States”). Amministrazione della Finanze del Stato v. Simmenthal SpA (case 106/77) [1978] ECR
629, 643.
6. This statement proves true at least in relation to the contemporary
English practice of legislative interpretation.
7. In the interest of textual simplicity, the phrase “European Court of
Justice” is used throughout this article to include the “Court of First Instance.”
8. The Sussex Peerage Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1057 (H.L. 1844).
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those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words
themselves alone do, in such a case, best declare the intention
of the lawgiver. 9

Admittedly, it is possible, though not usual, to read this
comment as being an affirmation of literalism as purposivism.
However, no such equivocation is possible in relation to Lord
Esher MR’s comment in R v. Judge of the City of London
Court:10 “If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them,
even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has
nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has
committed an absurdity.”11
The operation of this type of simple literalism may be illustrated by the case of Whiteley v. Chappell,12 which arose from
the statutory offence of impersonating “any person entitled to
vote” at an election.13 The defendant impersonated someone
whose name was on the register of electors but who had died
between the date on which the register had been compiled and
the date of the election.14 Although he was convicted at first
instance, his appeal was allowed on the ground that dead men
are not, in the words of the statute, “entitled to vote.”15
However, when viewed in its proper historical perspective,
the nineteenth century flourishing of literalism may be seen as
a temporary aberration.16 More particularly, in an earlier age,
when statutes were a relatively minor source of law, the English courts adopted an unashamedly purposive approach to leg9. See id. at 1057. See also In Re Bernard Boaver [1915] 1 K.B. 21, 27.
10. Queen v. Judge of the City of London Court [1892] 1 Q.B. 273.
11. Id. at 290.
12. Whiteley v. Chappell 4 Q.B. 147 (1868).
13. See Personation at Election of Guardians of the Poor, 14 & 15 Vict., ch.
105 §3 (1852) (Eng.). See also Whiteley, 4 Q.B. at 147.
14. Whiteley, 4 Q.B. at 147.
15. Id.
16. The reasons for this aberration are beyond the scope of this Article, but
they may be summarized thus. The combination of the traditional doctrine of
the legislative supremacy of Parliament and the progressive extension of the
franchise from the Great Reform Act of 1832 onward, seems to have created a
mindset on the part of judges that their role was to do what they were told by
the supreme and, by the standards of the time, increasingly democratically
validated Parliament. Additionally, the background of revolutionary activity
in continental Europe (especially from 1789 to 1848) can hardly have left the
judges in any doubt as to the potential consequences of failing to take account
of the popular will.
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islative interpretation, as the classic statement in Heydon’s
Case17 shows:
For the sure and true interpretation of all statutes...four
things are to be discerned and considered:
1st What was the Common Law before the making of
the Act?
2nd What was the mischief and defect for which the
Common Law did not provide?
3rd What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth?
4th The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of
all the judges is always to make such construction as shall
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and to
suppress continuance of the mischief...according to the
true intent of the makers of the Act.18

In due course, however, for the reasons outlined above,19 this
approach gave way to literalism, only to re-appear under the
name of purposivism, in the twentieth century.
More particularly, the ascendancy of purposivism may be associated with the period immediately after the Second World
War, when a great deal of social legislation was enacted.20 It
may be tentatively suggested that many judges in that context,
steeped in the democratic tradition, would naturally feel an obligation to promote the objects of the legislation where it was
possible to do so. However, whatever the reasons for the transition from literalism to purposivism may have been, that there
was such a transition is abundantly clear. In the words of Lord
Diplock, “If one looks back to the actual decisions of this
House...over the last thirty years one cannot fail to be struck by

17. Heydon’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584).
18. Id. at 638. It is submitted that the use of the word mischief rather
than purpose is immaterial.
19. See supra text accompanying notes 9–16.
20. See, for example, statutes as diverse as the National Health Service
Act 1946 and the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949.
National Health Service Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, ch. 81, National Parks and
Access to the Countryside Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 97 For the scope
of the former, see infra text accompanying note 75. The scope of the latter is
reasonably self-evident.
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the evidence of a trend away from the purely literal towards the
purposive construction of statutory provisions.”21
One reason for the resurgence of purposivism appears to be
the simple, if somewhat belated, realization that the idea of literal meaning is (or is likely to be) an illusion, as illustrated by
the case of Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd.22 The case required the court to decide whether a crematorium company’s
expenditure on a furnace chamber and chimney tower qualified
for a tax allowance.23 The answer to this question depended on
whether the work was within the definition of “an industrial
building or structure,” which, in turn, depended on whether the
chamber and chimney were used “for a trade which consists in
the manufacture of goods or materials or the subjection of goods
or material to any process.”24 Stamp J’s intuitive response to
this question was forthright:
I would say at once that my mind recoils as much from the description of the bodies of the dead as “goods or materials” as it
does from the idea that what is done in a crematorium can be
described as “the subjection of” the human corpse to a “process.” Nevertheless, the taxpayer so contends and I must examine that contention.25

Given the judge’s starting point, it is not altogether surprising that the taxpayer lost. For the present purposes, however,
the most important element of this decision lies in the following
statement of principle:
English words derive colour from those which surround them.
Sentences are not mere collections of words to be taken out of
the sentence, defined separately by reference to the dictionary
or decided cases, and then put back again into the sentence
with the meaning which one has assigned to them as separate
words so as to give the sentence or phrase a meaning which as
a sentence or phrase it cannot bear without distortion of the
English language. That one must construe a word or phrase in
a section of an Act of Parliament with all the assistance one
21. Carter v. Bradbeer [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1204, 1208. The transition was, of
course, gradual.
22. Bourne (Inspector of Taxes) v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd. [1967] 1
W.L.R. 691, 695.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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can from decided cases and, if you will, from the dictionary, is
not in doubt; but having obtained all that assistance, one must
not at the end of the day distort that which has to be construed and give it a meaning which in its context one would
not think it can possibly bear.26

Other reasons for the resurgence of purposivism may include
an increased awareness that it contributes to, rather than detracts from, the effectiveness of statutory law.27 The following
cases provide useful examples of the power of purposivism in
achieving results which could never flow from the application of
strict literalism. Moreover, some of them show that the power
of purposivism may extend even to cases where its application
will undermine English law’s traditional tendency to err on the
side of favouring the defence in criminal cases; and, perhaps
even more startlingly, may defeat property rights expressly conferred by statute.
Smith v. Hughes28 arose from Section 1 of the Street Offences
Act 1959, under which it was an offence “to solicit in a street ...
for the purpose of prostitution.”29 It fell to the High Court to
decide whether this provision applied where the prostitutes
were soliciting either from behind windows or on balconies overlooking the street, while the men who were being solicited were
in the street. Since the prostitutes themselves were plainly not
in the street, it was at least arguable that they should be acquitted.30 However, the court rejected this view, with Lord
Parker CJ saying, “Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along
the streets without being molested or solicited by common pros-

26. Id. at 696.
27. For example, see the comments of Lord Steyn, which are quoted below
in the context of interpreting legislation in the light of subsequent scientific
change in R (on the Application of Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilization and
Embryology Authority. R (on the Application of Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority [2002] 1 F.C.R. 664.
28. Smith v. Hughes, [1960] 1 W.L.R.. 830; see also Street Offences Act,
1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 57, § 1(1), (Eng.).
29. Street Offences Act, § 1(1).
30. On the basis that, as they were not in the street, it followed that they
could not be convicted of conduct (in this case soliciting) in the street. Hughes,
1 W.L.R..at 830.
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titutes ... For my part, I am content to base my decision on that
ground and that ground alone.”31
Other cases may not be characterized by the same level of
public awareness of the legislative purpose, but this need not
inhibit the courts from identifying and applying a putative purpose. For example, in Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith
Investments Ltd.,32 under Part II of the Landlord and Tenant
Act 1954, tenants of premises used for business purposes who
wished to have their expiring tenancies renewed were required
to ask their landlords to grant them new ones.33 If a landlord
refused to grant a new tenancy, the tenant then had a statutory
right to apply to the court, which could order the landlord to
grant a new tenancy.34 The case required the House of Lords to
consider the meaning and application of Section 29(3) of the
Act, which provided that, “no application ... shall be entertained
unless it is made not less than two nor more than four months
after...the making of the tenant’s request for a new tenancy.”35
This may be represented thus:
X ---------- 2 months ---------- Y ---------- 2 months ---------- Z
Date of tenant’s request
for new tenancy.

First date of
possible application to the
court.

Last date
of possible
application to
the court.

31. Id. at 832. Lord Parker's confidence that everyone knew the purpose of
the Act stemmed from the fact that it owed its genesis to the report of the
Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, chaired by Sir John
Wolfenden. The Wolfenden Report, as it was generally known, had given rise
to extensive public debate. Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, The Wolfenden Report cmt. 247 (1957).
32. Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd.,
[1970] 3 W.L.R.. 287.
33. Id. Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 56, § 26, (Eng.).
34. Id. at § 24.
35. Id. at § 29(3).
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In this case, the tenant’s application to the court was plainly
outside the statutory period.36 Nevertheless, the House of Lords
held that the statutory provision did not necessarily invalidate
the application,37 although Lord Diplock did acknowledge that:
[S]emantics and the rules of syntax alone could never justify
the conclusion that the words “No application...shall be entertained unless” meant that some applications should be entertained notwithstanding that neither of the conditions which
follow the word “unless” was fulfilled.38

The key to Lord Diplock’s reasoning lies in his decision that of
the purposes of the Landlord and Tenant Act is to encourage
landlords and tenants to proceed by agreement wherever possible, together with his view that the time limit in question as
purely procedural.39 On this basis, it followed that landlords
should be entitled to waive compliance with the time limit if
they so wished. Therefore, in a case where the application to
the court is made out of time, the first question for the court is
whether the landlord has, in fact, waived the right to rely on
observance of the time limits.40
As we have seen,41 purposivism may even prevail over the
criminal law’s traditional bias in favour of the defence. The
case of R. v. Pigg42 concerned the validity of a rape conviction,
where the verdict had been by a majority.43 Section 17(3) of the
Juries Act, 197444 provided that a majority verdict could not be
accepted unless “the foreman of the jury has stated in open
36. In fact, it was made approximately half way through the initial two
month period. The reason for error appears to have been the tenant’s solicitor’s ignorance of the statutory time-scale. Kammins Ballrooms, 3 W.L.R.. at
287.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. On the facts of the case, the landlord had not waived his right to rely
on the statutory time limits, but this does not invalidate Lord Diplock’s approach to the interpretation of the provision. Id. at 299–300.
41. Smith, [1960] 1 W.L.R. at 830.
42. R. v. Pigg, [1982] 1 W.L.R.. 6 (Eng.).
43. Id.
44. After centuries during which a conviction could flow only from a
unanimous verdict, the possibility of conviction by a majority verdict (of either
ten or eleven where there were twelve jurors, or nine where there were ten)
had been introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 1967. Id.
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court the number of jurors who respectively agreed to and dissented from the verdict.”45 In this case, when the foreman indicated that ten jurors had agreed to convict, the clerk of the
court replied “ten agreed to two of you,” to which the foreman
made no response.46 Although the foreman’s failure to say how
many jurors had disagreed was a clear contravention of the
plain words of the statute, Lord Brandon declined to treat this
failure as being fatal to the resulting conviction:
If the foreman of the jury states no more than that the number
agreeing to the verdict is ten, it is nevertheless a necessary
and inevitable inference, obvious to any ordinary person, that
the number dissenting from the verdict is two. True it is that
the foreman of the jury has not said so in terms as the 1974
Act, interpreted literally, requires. In my opinion, however, it
is the substance of the requirement...which has to be complied
with, and the precise form of words by which such compliance
is achieved, so long as the effect is clear, is not material.47

The purposive approach, even when it is not expressly labelled as such, may even override property rights which have
been conferred by statute, as illustrated by Re Sigsworth.48 The
key provision was Section 46 of the Administration of Estates
Act, 1925, which laid down, in absolute and unqualified terms,
the order of inheritance in cases where people had died without
making their wills.49 On the facts of the case, the effect of the
provision would have been that a murderer would have inherited the estate of his victim.50 Clauson J, in the High Court,
disapplied the provision, on the basis that, by parity of reasoning, the case was governed by the “well-settled principle that
public policy precludes a sane murderer from taking a benefit
under a victim’s will.”51 In other words, “the principle…must be
45. Juries Act, 1974, c. 23, § 17(3), (Eng.).
46. Pigg, [1982] 1 W.L.R.. at 6.
47. Id. at 12.
48. In re Sigsworth, [1935] 1 Ch. 98.; Administration of Estates Act, 1925,
c. 23, § 46 (Eng.).
49. In re Sigsworth, [1935] 1 Ch. at 98.
50. Id.
51. Id. The principle, which in relation to testate succession is, of course,
the basis of the decision in Riggs v. Palmer, is simply one application of a the
more general principle that there is a presumption that Parliament did not
intend to all people to gain advantages from their own wrongdoing. Riggs v.
Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889). For another example of this pre-
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so far regarded in the construction of Acts of Parliament that
general words which might include cases obnoxious to the principle must be read and construed as subject to it.”52
Finally, the courts may use the purposive approach to deal
with problems which arise from social and scientific changes.
Two cases — one dealing with social change and one with scientific change — will suffice as examples.
In Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association Ltd,53 the
House of Lords held that, for the purposes of Schedule I to the
Housing Act, 1977, where a tenant of a dwelling died, leaving a
same-sex partner with whom he had lived and who wished to
remain in the dwelling, the survivor was a member of the deceased tenant’s family living with him at the time of his death.54
The practical consequence of this provision was that the survivor was entitled to inherit both the tenancy and security of tenure.55 As Lord Nicholls put it, when discussing the meaning of
the word family for the purposes of the statute:
In the present case Parliament used an ordinary word of flexible meaning and left it undefined. The underlying legislative
purpose was to provide a secure home for those who share
their lives together with the original tenant in the manner
which characterizes a family unit. This purpose would be at
risk of being stultified if the courts could not have regard to
changes in the way people live together and changes in the
perception of relationships.56

In the context of scientific developments, the decision in R (on
the Application of Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority57 is instructive. The Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act, 1990 regulated the creation and use of

sumption in operation, see Re X (A Minor) (Adoption Details: Disclosure),
[1994] 3 W.L.R. 327, discussed in IAN MCLEOD, LEGAL METHOD 310–11 (4th
ed., 2002).
52. In re Sigsworth, [1935] 1. Ch. 89.
53. Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Ass’n Ltd., [1999] 4 All E.R. 705 (H.L.
1999).
54. Id. at 717; Rent Act, 1977, ch. 42 (Eng.).
55. Rent Act, sch. 1, para. 3.
56. Fitzpatrick, 4 All E.R. at 722.
57. Regina (on the application of Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority, [2003] 2 All E.R. 105.
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human embryos outside the body.58 At the time of enactment,
fertilisation provided the only means of creating a human embryo.59 Subsequently, scientists developed the technique of cloning by a process known as cell nuclear replacement (“CNR”).60
The issue in the case was whether the scheme contained in the
Act applied to embryos created by CNR.61 Holding that there
was a plain Parliamentary intention that the Act should apply
to all embryos created outside the human body, irrespective of
the means of their genesis, Lord Steyn observed:
In order to give effect to a plain Parliamentary purpose, a
statute may sometimes be held to cover a scientific development not known when the statute was passed. Given that
Parliament legislates on the assumption that statutes may be
in place for many years, and that Parliament wishes to pass
effective legislation, this is a benign principle designed to
achieve the wishes of Parliament.62

58. See Regina (on the application of Quintavalle) v. Secretary of State for
Health, [2003] 2 All E.R. 113, 116.
59. Accordingly, the word “embryo” was defined for the purposes of the Act,
and “except where otherwise stated” in terms of fertilization. See Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § § 1(1) (Eng.).
60. See id.
CNR is a process by which the nucleus, which is a diploid, from one
cell is transplanted into an unfertilized egg, from which…the nucleus
has been removed. The [replacement] nucleus is derived from either
an embryonic or a foetal or an adult cell. The cell is then treated to
encourage it to grow and divide, forming first a two-cell structure and
then developing in a similar way to an ordinary embryo.
CNR is a form of cloning. Clones are organisms that are genetically
identical to each other. When CNR is used, if the embryo develops
into an live individual, that individual is genetically identical to the
nucleus transplanted into the egg. There are other methods of cloning, for example, embryo splitting, which may occur naturally or be
encouraged. Identical twins are a result of embryo splitting.
The famous Dolly the sheep was produced by CNR. Live young have
been since produced by CNR in some other mammals. It has not yet
been attempted in humans.
Id.
61. Id. at 115.
62. Regina v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Auth., [2002] 2 All E.R.
625, 722.
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In this case, therefore, from the point of view of the protection
afforded to it by the statute, an embryo is an embryo irrespective of its genesis. It follows that the courts should not deny
some embryos the benefit of this statutory protection simply
because of advances in medical technology occurring after the
statute was enacted.
Although the cases discussed above provide clear examples of
the modern English practice of purposivism, they generally provide little guidance as to how the legislative purpose is to be
identified.63
III. IDENTIFYING LEGISLATIVE PURPOSES IN ENGLISH LAW
Having established that purposivism is the predominant
technique of legislative interpretation in English law, the next
task is to ascertain the means by which the legislative purpose
is to be identified. In common with all other legal systems
which have emerged and evolved over time, English law contains no single identifiable statement of its own purposes. Furthermore, one consequence of the informality of the British
Constitution is that there is similarly no simple and straightforward statement of its fundamental, underpinning values.64
Nevertheless, few would seek to deny that, generally speaking,
the British Constitution accords high priority to a variety of
basic values, with obvious examples being the presumptive protection of the subject’s right of access to justice (an important
aspect of which is that the jurisdiction of the courts can be
ousted only by clear words to that effect), and the presumption
against gaining advantage from wrongdoing.65 Two examples

63. With the exception Hughes, [1960] 1 W.L.R. at 830.
64. Perhaps to some extent making a virtue out of necessity, English common lawyers often emphasize the pragmatism of the common law. See, e.g., R.
v. Higher Education Funding Council ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery,
[1994] 1 All E.R. 651. No doubt the common law will develop, as the common
law does, case by case. It is not entirely satisfactory that this should be so,
not least because experience suggests that in the absence of a prior principle
irreconcilable or inconsistent decisions will emerge. But from the tenor of the
decisions principles will come, and if the common law's pragmatism has a
virtue, it is that these principles are likely to be robust. Id. at 666 (Sedley J.).
65. Values such as these are, of course, common to the Western liberal
tradition as a whole, and no claim is being advanced here that they are
uniquely characteristic of the English legal system.
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(one in relation to each of these values) will suffice for illustrative purposes.
First, in Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission,66
the House of Lords held that a statutory provision that determinations of the Foreign Compensation Commission67 “shall not
be called into question in any court of law”68 did not preclude the
court from considering a claim that an apparent determination
was ultra vires and void as a matter of law (and, therefore,
could not be accurately described as being a determination at
all).69 In other words, if the legislative purpose includes removing the subject’s right of access to the courts in order to challenge the legality of a public body’s decision-making processes,
Parliament must make that purpose abundantly plain, because
the courts will be unwilling to presume such a purpose on any
other basis.
Secondly, it is worth recalling In Re Sigsworth,70 where the
court relied on the fundamental principle of the common law
which prevents gaining advantage from wrongdoing, in order to
avoid a result which could not have been within the scope of the
legislative intention.71
Quite apart from relying on the application of basic principles
such as those exemplified by the Anisminic and Sigsworth
cases, the English courts may have recourse to a number of aids
when seeking to identify legislative intention. Some of these
aids are internal to the text in question, while others are external. Taking internal aids first, there is always the possibility
that a statute will contain an express purpose section. In prac66. Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 1 All E.R. 208.
67. The Foreign Compensation Commission was established by the Foreign
Compensation Act 1950 to handle claims for compensation made by British
subjects against foreign governments. Foreign Compensation Act, 1950, 14
Geo. 6, ch. 12, § 4(4) (Eng.). The scheme was that a foreign government which
was liable to compensate British subjects would make a lump sum payment to
the British government, on whose behalf the Foreign Compensation Commission would entertain claims and decide which were valid and which were invalid, before proceeding to quantify compensation in respect of those which were
valid. The present case arose out of compensation due in consequence of the
Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez canal.
68. Foreign Compensation Act, § 4(4).
69. Anisminic, 1 All E.R. at 221.
70. In re Sigsworth, [1935] 1 Ch. at 98.
71. Id. at 89.
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tice these are very rare, but the Children Act, 1989 and the Arbitration Act, 1996 provide two relatively recent examples of
provisions which furnish at least some guidance as to how problems of interpretation should be approached.72
More useful in practice, because they are universally present,
are the long titles of statutes, which may provide “the plainest
of all guides to the general objectives of a statute,” and short
titles, although it must be remembered that, in the nature of
short titles, “accuracy may have been sacrificed to brevity.”73
Reference may also be made to marginal notes. The classic
72. §1 of the Children Act 1989 is as follows:
1.

Welfare of the Child
(1) When a court determines any question with respect to (a) the upbringing of a child; or
(b) the administration of a child's property or the application of any income arising from it, the child's welfare shall be
the court's paramount consideration.

(2) In any proceedings in which any question with respect to the
upbringing of a child arises, the court shall have regard to the
general principle that any delay in determining the question is
likely to prejudice the welfare of the child.'
Children Act, 1989, c. 41, §1 (Eng.). §1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 is as follows:
1. General Principles
The provisions of this Part of this Act are founded on the following
principles, and shall be construed accordingly (a) the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense;
(b) the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the
public interest;
(c) in matters governed by this Part the court should not intervene except as provided by this Part.
Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 1 (Eng.)
73. Scrutton LJ, In re Boaler, 1 K.B. at 21. For an example of a short title
and a long title (reversing the order in which they appear in the text to this
note), see the National Health Service Act 1946 which is an Act to provide for
the establishment of a comprehensive health service for England and Wales
and for purposes connected herewith. Boaler, [1915] 1 K.B. 21 (Scrutton, LJ);
National Health Services Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 81 (Eng.).
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example is Stephens v. Cuckfield Rural District Council,74 where
the council served a notice requiring a landowner to tidy up a
site which was seriously injurious to the amenity of the district.75 The statutory power76 was exercisable only in respect of
“a garden, vacant site or other open space.”77 The question for
the court was whether the power was exercisable in respect of a
car-breaker’s yard.78 While the site was clearly an “open space”
(in the sense that it was uncovered), the court nevertheless decided that the statutory power was not exercisable. One thread
in the reasoning leading to this conclusion was that the marginal note to the section referred to “power to require proper
maintenance of waste land etc,” and it was clear beyond doubt
that the site in question did not fall within this category.79 Referring to the marginal note and its relevance to the process of
interpretation, Upjohn LJ said, “While the marginal note to a
section cannot control the language used in the section, it is at
least permissible to approach a consideration of its general purpose and the mischief at which it is aimed with the note in
mind.”80
Going beyond the confines of the statute itself, material may
be conveniently divided into three categories (namely, preParliamentary, Parliamentary and post-Parliamentary) in order to assess the extent to which material within each category
may be used in order to identify the legislative purpose. PreParliamentary, such as reports of official committees and Royal
Commissions, are generally accepted as being relevant when
seeking to establish the purpose — but not the meaning — of
ensuing legislation.81 Parliamentary materials82 may normally

74. Stephens v. Cuckfield Rural District Council, [1960] 2 Q.B. 373.
75. Id. at 376.
76. Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 33 (1).
77. See Cuckfield Rural District Council, [1960] 2 Q.B. at 373. See also
Town and Country Planning Act § 33.
78. Cuckfield Rural District Council, [1960] 2 Q.B. at 374.
79. Id. at 378–79.
80. Id.
81. R. v. Allen, [1985] 2 All E.R. 641. For an example of the use of preParliamentary materials in order to identify the legislative purpose, see
Hughes, 2 All E.R. at 859 (relying on the Wolfenden Report).
82. In practice, the phrase Parliamentary materials almost invariably
means the official record of Parliamentary business (including verbatim re-
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be used for the purposes of statutory interpretation in only very
limited circumstances, namely
where (a) legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to an
absurdity; (b) the material relied upon consists of one or more
statements by a minister or other promoter of the Bill together, if necessary with such other Parliamentary material as
is necessary to understand such statements and their effect;
(c) the statements relied upon are clear.83

Taking these elements in turn, there will be many cases in
which the requirement of ambiguity or obscurity either indubitably exists or, at least, can be made to appear to exist by a
skilled advocate. Having thus established a very broad criterion, the House immediately proceeded to limit the scope of the
new doctrine by restricting the use of Parliamentary materials
to statements made by whoever introduced the Bill which became the Act which falls to be interpreted.84 The third requirement (namely, that the statements should be clear) may seem
sensible enough, but once again, the ingenuity of the advocate
may well be enough to introduce sufficient doubt to exclude reliance on any particular statement.
In addition to the general rule expressed above, there is one
further rule of much more limited scope: when interpreting legislation which has been passed to implement a Community law
obligation, reference may be made to Parliamentary materials
in order to identify the extent of that obligation.85 The most obvious example of this would be where legislation is enacted to
implement a Directive,86 but the principle applies equally to all
forms of Community legislation.87

ports of debates in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords)
which are published in Hansard.
83. See Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All ER 42, 69 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson,
concurring with five of the other six Law Lords; Lord Mackay LC, dissenting).
84. In practice, almost all Bills are government Bills and, therefore, the
person to whose statements the court may refer will almost invariably be a
government minister.
85. Pickstone v. Freemans PLC [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 221, 238–44 (Lord
Oliver’s opinion).
86. Directives require member states to achieve defined objectives while
leaving it to each member state to identify and adopt whatever mechanism it
considers to be appropriate to achieve the objective in question, within the
context of its own legal system. See Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
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Having discussed the origin, evolution, nature and power of
purposivism in the English common law, it is now appropriate
to turn to its position in European Community law.
IV. LITERAL AND PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW
The idea of literalism has never been central to the civil law88
tradition in which Community law is rooted. Moreover, and
perhaps more importantly, literalism is intrinsically unlikely to
play a significant part in a multi-lingual system in which all
languages (nine, in the case of the Community) are equally authentic. Overall, therefore, it is hardly surprising that, as the
following discussion will show, the European Court of Justice
attaches much greater importance to factors such as the overall
legislative scheme and its purposes than it does to the idea of
the literal meaning of the words used to convey that scheme
and those purposes.
In Wendelboe v. LJ Music,89 the European Court of Justice
had to interpret Article 3(1) of the Transfer of Undertakings
Directive, which the Court abbreviated as, “[T]he transferor’s
rights and obligations arising from a contract of employment or
from an employment relationship existing at the date of a
transfer…shall, by reason of such transfer, be transferred to the
transferee.”90 The question was whether it was the contract of
employment or the obligations which had to be existing at the
date of the transfer. In the English and Danish versions of the
text, either conclusion was possible, but the Dutch, French,
German, Greek and Italian versions were open to only one literal interpretation, namely that it was the contract of employment (or employment relationship) which had to be in existence
at the date of the transfer. In other words, having read all the
official language versions, it was impossible to conclude that
there was a single, literal meaning.

nomic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, Art. 249, 298 U.N.T.S. 36 (i.e. Treaty of
Rome 1957).
87. For example, in Pickstone, the English legislation had been triggered
by a regulation. See Pickstone, [1988] 2 All E.R. at 803.
88. Using the term “civil law” to mean “Roman law based.”
89. Wendelboe v. L.J. Music APS, [1985] E.C.R. 457 (Eng.).
90. Id. at 466.
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Although the version contained in the majority languages
prevailed in this case, there is no principle which requires that
this shall be so in all cases. For example, in Elefanten Schuh v.
Jacqmain,91 the European Court of Justice had to interpret Article 18 of the European Community Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Judgments 1968.92 The problem arose
from a discrepancy between the French and Irish texts on the
one hand and the English, Danish, Dutch, German and Italian
texts on the other.93 More particularly, the English text representing the majority, provided that “a court of a Contracting
State before whom a defendant enters an appearance shall have
jurisdiction. This rule shall not apply where appearance was
entered solely to contest the jurisdiction.”94 Assuming that the
word “solely” means something, the effect of this version is that
defendants who wish to contest both the jurisdiction of the court
and (if they lose the jurisdiction argument) the merits of the
case, must be taken as having submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court.95 The European Court of Justice upheld the French
and Irish versions (neither of which contained anything equivalent to the word “solely”) on the basis that these were “more in
keeping with the objectives and spirit of the Convention” than
were the alternative language versions.96
Of course, the lack of status which Community law accords to
the literal technique leaves open the question of which other
technique (or techniques) should be adopted. There is no universally agreed terminology for describing those techniques, but
the two concepts which are involved are sometimes labelled contextual or schematic and teleological.97 Advocate-General May-

91. Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain, [1981] E.C.R. 1671 (Eng.).
92. The European Community Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments 1968 is commonly known as the Brussels Convention.
93. Jacqmain, [1981] E.C.R. at 1671.
94. Id. (citing Article 18 of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968,
1978 O.J. (L 304) 36).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1685.
97. Rules of Interpretation of ECC Laws [1989] STAT LR 163, 168–73
(where Millett uses “schematic” and “teleological”). See generally STEPHEN
WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW (3d ed. 1999) (where the authors use
“contextual” and “schematic”).
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ras brought the whole topic into sharp focus when he said that
the principal aim of the court was to identify the clear meaning:
[T]his Court may not substitute its discretion for that of the
Community legislature; when the meaning of the legislation is
clear it has to be applied with that meaning, even if the solution prescribed may be thought to be unsatisfactory. That is
not to say, however, that the literal construction of a provision
must always be accepted. If such construction were to lead to
a nonsensical result in regard to a situation which the Court
believed the provision was intended to cover, certain doubts
might properly be entertained in regard to it. In other words,
the clear meaning and the literal meaning are not synonymous. There have been many cases in which the Court has rejected a literal interpretation in favour of another which it
found more compatible with the objective and the whole scheme
of the legislation in question.98

As Advocate-General Mayras acknowledged, both the objective (or purpose) and the scheme of the legislation have to be
considered.99 In practice, these two factors are commonly so
closely inter-twined or overlapping as to amount to one single,
contextual factor.100
One of the earliest and most important examples of schematic
(or teleological) interpretation may be found in van Gend en
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,101 where a
Dutch company was aggrieved by a contravention of Article 12
(now Article 25) of the Community Treaty, which prohibits
member states from “introducing between themselves any new
98. Fellinger v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, [1980] 1 E.C.R. 535, 550 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 550.
100. Indeed, it is difficult to see any point in making the distinction in the
first place, since at least part of the purpose of any piece of Community legislation must be to advance either the scheme of Community law as a whole or
some identifiable part thereof. It is difficult, therefore, to disagree with Lord
Mackenzie Stuart, the United Kingdom’s first judge in the European Court of
Justice, who once commented that he wished to add nothing to the discussion
of the nature of the interpretations “except a note of scepticism and the suggestion there are dangers in over-analysis.” See LORD MACKENZIE STUART,
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THE RULE OF LAW 72 (1977). For further
comment on identifying the legislative purpose of Community legislation, see
Case 26/62, Van gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
1963 E.C.R. 1.
101. Van gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 1.
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customs duties….”102 For the present purposes, the question
was whether the company could enforce the article against the
Dutch customs authorities in the Dutch courts.103 The European
Court of Justice said:
The very nature of this prohibition makes it ideally adapted to
produce direct effects in the legal relationship between the
member states and their subjects
...
It follows...that, according to the spirit, the general scheme
and the wording of the Treaty, article 12 must be interpreted
as producing direct effects and creating individual rights
which national courts must protect.104

In other words, the whole scheme, and therefore an identifiable purpose, of Community law contributed to the requirement
of an affirmative answer to the question raised by the company;
and this answer was also supported by the wording of the relevant article.
However, in some cases the other factors may well operate to
negative the literal meaning. For example, in Commission v.
Netherlands,105 the issue was whether butter which was being
stored in Dutch customs warehouses (and which formed part of
the Community’s so-called butter mountain) could lawfully be
re-packed into smaller quantities.106 In response to the Dutch
argument that this was a well-established national practice, the
European Court of Justice said:
The…argument which seeks to establish that the contested
packing is one of the forms of handling specified in article 1(1)
of Directive 71/235, inasmuch as it was traditionally authorized in Netherlands customs warehouses, cannot be accepted.
Although the inventory of national practices was carried out at
an early stage in the preparatory work for the Directive, its
purpose was not to maintain them but, on the contrary, to
harmonize them.
….

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 12.
Commission v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, [1983] 1 E.C.R. 1195.
Id. at 1196.
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In the Court’s opinion, the question whether or not the contested packing comes within the scope of the customs warehousing procedure laid down by Directive 71/235 cannot be decided by reference to the [text]; instead, the operation must be
considered in the light of the objective of the customs warehousing procedure.107

Between the extremes of confirming and negating the literal
meaning, there lies the possibility of using the schematic technique to fill in the gaps, a classic example of which is Commission v. United Kingdom.108 The United Kingdom had introduced
the Road Vehicles Lighting Regulations, 1984.109 These Regulations required motor vehicles to be fitted with a dim-dip device,
which would produce an intensity of beam below that of ordinary dipped headlamps whenever a vehicle’s ignition was
switched on.110 The Commission claimed that these Regulations
infringed Council Directive 76/756/EEC on the approximation of
the laws of the member states relating to the installation of
lighting and light-signalling devices on motor vehicles and their
trailers.111 The United Kingdom responded that the Directive
was non-exhaustive and merely prohibited refusal of typeapproval for vehicles on grounds relating to the lighting and
light-signalling devices listed in an Annex to the Directive.112
Since dim-dip devices were not within the scope of the Annex,
the United Kingdom argued that it followed that there was no
infringement of the Directive.113 The European Court of Justice,
however, took the view that the purpose of the Directive was to
promote freedom of trade in motor vehicles across the Community, and that unique requirements of the type imposed by the
United Kingdom in this case were incompatible with that purpose.114
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that Community Law
acknowledges literal meaning as only one element in the matrix
107. Id. at 1205 (emphasis added).
108. Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
[1988] 7 E.C.R. 3921.
109. Road Vehicles Lighting Regulations, S.I. 812 (1984).
110. Commission v. United Kingdom, 7 E.C.R. at 3932.
111. Id. at 3924–25.
112. Id. at 3926.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 3935.
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of considerations by reference to which the legal meaning of a
legislative instrument is to be identified, with the purpose of
the legislative scheme being a further (and, in practice, more
important) element within that matrix. What must now be considered is how legislative purposes are to be identified within
Community Law.
V. IDENTIFYING LEGISLATIVE PURPOSES IN COMMUNITY LAW
The discussion of interpretation in the European Court has
been able to proceed thus far on the basis of Community law as
an all-embracing term, with legislative interpretation being
given a correspondingly all-embracing meaning. However,
when proceeding to discuss the identification of legislative purposes it is necessary, for some purposes, to distinguish between
Community treaties and Community legislation, according to
which usage legislation has the narrower meaning of regulations, directives and decisions.115
Proceeding to the substance of the discussion, it is useful to
emphasize the contrast between the synthetic (or constructed)
nature of the Community’s legal system and the natural (or
spontaneous) character of domestic legal systems. One important aspect of this is that the whole Community, including its
legal system, is based on expressly articulated objectives (or
purposes).116 For example, and to begin at the beginning, the
preamble to the Community Treaty identifies a number of social
and economic ideals as the foundation for achieving “an ever
closer union among the peoples of Europe.”117
In addition to these general statements of the purposes of the
system of Community law as a whole, individual pieces of legislation (that is to say, regulations, directives and decisions) will
each have their own purposes. The general proposition is, unsurprisingly, that Community legislation should be interpreted,
so far as possible, in ways which make it consistent with the
115. See Lord Slynn of Hadley, Looking at European Community Texts,
STAT. L.R. 12, 13 (1993).
116. As has already been noted supra Part II, second paragraph, this is in
marked contrast to domestic legal systems. See accompanying text and supra
note 16.
117. Consolidated Version Of The Treaty Establishing The European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 324) 33, 39 (2002). Article 2 of the Treaty sets
out the task of the Community in broadly similar terms. Id. at 40.
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Treaties and the general principles of Community law.118 More
specifically, the operative part of each piece of Community legislation will be preceded by citations and recitals.
Citations consist of a number of short paragraphs, each of
which begins with the words “having regard to.”119 Citations
will typically identify the relevant treaty article(s) and any
relevant proposals, opinions and consultations in which the legislation in question purports to locate its legal base. Clearly,
therefore, while citations are important in those cases where an
issue arises as to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of legislation,
they also serve the purpose of identifying the legislative purpose as an aid to interpretation, which is a skill much more
commonly required in legal practice.
Recitals consist of a number of paragraphs that are generally
rather longer than those constituting citations, each of which
begins with the word “whereas.”120 Recitals set out the reasons
underlying the legislation and may, therefore, be very helpful in
identifying the legislative purpose(s).
Going outside the text of the treaties, the travaux préparatoires may be used for the purposes of interpretation, provided
it is remembered that “any argument… which is not based on
the Treaty itself cannot be decisive.”121 However, such aids, and
therefore their limited assistance, will not always be available.
In such cases, “in the absence of working documents clearly expressing the intention of the draftsmen of a provision, the Court
can base itself only on the scope of the wording as it is.”122
Travaux préparatoires are also relevant to the interpretation
of Community legislation. For example, in Stauder v. City of
Ulm,123 the Court noted that a recital to a decision showed an
intention to adopt an amendment to the decision which had
been proposed when an earlier draft was being considered.124
118. Klensch v. Secretaire d’Etata a l’Agriculture et a la Viticulture, [1986]
10 E.C.R. 3477; Rauh v. Hauptzollamt Nurnberg-Furth, [1991] 3 E.C.R. 1647.
119. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 282/2004, 2004 J.O. (L 49) 11; Commission Regulation 283/2004, 2004 J.O. (L 49) 25.
120. Id.
121. Case 362, Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium, 1964 E.C.R. 625
(opinion of A-G Roemer).
122. Simon v. Court of Justice, 1961 E.C.R. 115.
123. Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419.
124. See supra text accompanying note 4.
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Similarly, the Court of Justice has held that letters sent by the
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community to
the addressee of a decision, were available as aids to the interOn the other hand,
pretation of the decision itself.125
“[s]ubsequent statements originating from officials of the High
Authority cannot have any influence on the interpretation of
decisions made by the latter, at least when such interpretation,
irrespective of the statements made, leads to a logical result.”126
The cases identified and discussed above lead to the conclusion that Community law contains a more developed body of
authority as to the identification of legislative purposes than
does English common law. Perhaps, however, this is less than
altogether surprising, bearing in mind the teleological tradition
of interpretation in which Community law is rooted.
VI. THE USE OF COMMUNITY TECHNIQUES OF INTERPRETATION
IN ENGLISH COURTS
As we have seen, at an early stage in the United Kingdom’s
membership of the Community Lord Denning MR accepted the
need for English courts to employ the Community law method
when interpreting Community legislation.127 The point was further emphasized in Henn & Darby v. Director of Public Prosecutions,128 where the issue was whether an English prohibition on
the importation of obscene articles129 was contrary to Article 30
of the Treaty of Rome, 1957 which prohibited quantitative restrictions on imports from between member state.130 Responding to a preliminary reference from the House of Lords, the
European Court of Justice said it was well established in Community law, that a total prohibition is a quantitative restriction
for the present purposes. When the case returned to the House
of Lords, Lord Diplock said:
In the Court of Appeal considerable doubt was expressed by
that court as to whether an absolute prohibition on the import
125. Societa Industriale Acciaiere San Michele v. High Authority of the
European Coal and Steel Community, [1964] C.M.L.R. 146 (1964).
126. Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v. High Authority, [1964] C.M.L.R 384.
127. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
128. Henn & Darby v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1981] A.C. 850.
129. See Customs Consolidations Act, 1876, c. 36, § 42 (Eng.).
130. Treaty of Rome, 1957, c. 2, art. 30.
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of a particular description of goods could amount to a quantitative restriction or a measure having equivalent effect, so as
to fall within the ambit of art. 30 at all. That such doubt
should be expressed shows the danger of an English court applying English canons of statutory construction to the interpretation of the Treaty or, for that matter, of Regulations or
Directives.131

From the Community perspective, the requirement of the
adoption of shared techniques is not only a means of maximising the coherence of Community law as a whole,132 but is also an
aspect of the doctrine which received one formulation in von
Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,133 before being re-inforced
in Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA.134 In von Colson the European Court of Justice
said:
In applying the national law and in particular the provision of
a national law specifically introduced in order to implement [a
Directive], national courts are required to interpret their national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the
Directive in order to achieve the result referred to in [the
Treaty].135

Although this statement emphasizes the position in relation
to provisions specifically introduced to implement Community
obligations, when read as a whole it is reasonably clear that it
is intended to apply equally to all national provisions. Any
doubt in this respect was laid to rest in Marleasing, which
obliges national courts to interpret national law in accordance
with Community law wherever this is possible, even if no national legislation has been enacted specifically to comply with
Community law.136 This includes the situation in which the
relevant national law consists of prior legislation, which plainly
cannot have been enacted to comply with a provision of Community law which did not exist at the time of its enactment.
131. See Henn & Darby, [1981] A.C. at 904.
132. See Simmenthal SpA, [1978] E.C.R. 629, 643.
133. Case 14/83, Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1984] E.C.R. 1891, 2
C.M.L.R. 430 (1984).
134. Case C-106/89, Marleasing S.A. v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación S.A., 1990 E.C.R. I-4135, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 305 (1992).
135. Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
136. Marleasing, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 305, 307.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Both the English common law and Community law approach
the task of legislative interpretation in a purposive, or teleological, way. However, there is a significant difference between the
two systems, in that lawyers operating within the Community
legal system may refer to explicitly articulated statements of
legislative purpose. By way of contrast, while the English legal
system provides some aids to identifying legislative purposes,
those purposes are almost always less explicitly identified. It
follows both that the identification of legislative purposes is
more difficult in English than in Community law, and that it is
more difficult to be confident of the accuracy of any identification which is made.
Finally, and at the risk of stating the obvious, it may be
worth commenting that, as the quantity of litigation coming
before the Court of Justice demonstrates, the ability to identify
legislative purposes both more simply and more accurately than
is usually possible in the English legal system, does not necessarily guarantee that disputes will be resolved without recourse
to the courts.

